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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-SuITs AGAINST THE CROWN-JURISDICTION OF COURTS.-
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant, "his Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State for War," for breach of a contract and for a declaratory
judgment concerning its meaning. Held, that a servant of the Crown who
contracts on behalf of the Crown cannot be sued on his contract and that an
action will not lie against him for a declaration as to the meaning of the con-
tract. Hosier Brothers v. Earl of Derby, Secretary of State for War (1918,
C. A.) xi9 L. T. Rep. 351.
The remedy in England for breach of contract by the government is by
petition of right and not by action. An action is denied by reason of the
principle of the English law that a sovereign can do no wrong and that when
government officials make a contract with an individual it is the sovereign who
acts through them. Following the English rule, no common law remedy existed
in this country for the breach of a contract by the national or by a state
government. The petition of right was deemed inapplicable because the execu-
tive is not regarded as the sovereign. The sole remedy open to the individual
was a petition to the legislature for an appropriation to pay his claim. Legis-.
lation now permits such suits against the federal government to be filed in the
U. S. Court of Claims. Similarly, some of the states allow suits to be brought
against the state in the ordinary state courts. See Goodnow, The Principles
of Administrative Law of the United States, 387-392.
CONSTITUTIONAL LA--INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF STATE CHARGE TO
INTERSTATE RAILROAD FOR PERMISSION TO IssuE BOND.-The Union Pacific
Railroad Company, a Utah corporation, with a line over thirty-five hundred
miles long extending through several states, has only about six-tenths of a
mile of main track in Missouri and the value of its property in that state is
only a little over one per cent. of the value of all its .property. The business
it does in Missouri is purely interstate. Desiring to issue bonds secured by-
mortgage on the whole line, the Railroad Company applied to the Missouri
Public Service Commission for a certificate authorizing the issue. A similar
application was made in all states through which the road passes. The Mis-
souri Commission granted the authority but charged a fee fixed by the letter
of the state statute at a percentage of the total bond issue authorized. In
order to obtain the certificate the Railroad Company paid this fee, but at the
time protested in writing that it paid under duress, i. e., in order to escape the
statutory penalties. On a certiorari proceeding to set aside the Commission's
judgment as an unlawful interference with interstate commerce, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that by applying for the certificate under the statute
the Railroad Company was "estopped" from questioning the validity of the
charge. The Railroad Company then took the case to the Supreme Court of
the United States. Held, that the state statute was an unlawful interference
with interstate commerce and that the Railroad Company was not "estopped"
by hs application from questioning the constitutionality of the statute. Union
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Missouri (Dec. 9, 1918) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, No. 65.
That the state statute imposed an unlawful burden upon interstate commerce
is too clear to admit of doubt, as two very recent cases show. Looney v. Crane
Co. (1917) 245 U. S. 178, 38 Sup. Ct. 85; International Paper Co. v. Massa-
chusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 135, 38 Sup. Ct. 292. As the certificate was a com--
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mercial necessity for the issue of the bonds-they would not be marketable
without it-and as very severe statutory penalties were threatened if the bonds
were issued without the certificate, the court very properly held that there
was sufficient duress to prevent the payment from being "voluntary" in such
sense that the so-called "estoppel" theory would apply. As the court points
out, all acts done under duress are voluntary in the sense that the party under
duress chooses the lesser of two evils. "The fact that a choice was made
according to interest does not exclude duress."
CONTRACTS-MISTAKE INDUcED BY FRAU---RETENTION OF BENEFnrs.-The
plaintiff orally agreed to adjust the loss under an insurance contract for $335.
When reducing the oral agreement to writing the defendant's agent, taking
advantage of plaintiff's illiteracy, fraudulently induced the plaintiff to sign an
agreement to accept $25o in full payment. In answer to the plaintiff's action
on the 9ral agreement, the defendant set up the written agreement and per-
formance thereunder. Held, that the signed writing did not constitute a
contract, and that plaintiff could recover the balance due without returning
what he had received. Grace, J., dissenting. Mathias v. State Farmer's Mutual
Ins. Co. (I918, N. D.) I68 N. W. 664.
A document signed'under these circumstances has frequently been held to be
wholly inoperative, not even conferring upon its fraudulent holder the power
of creating rights in a bona fide purchaser for value. Foster v. Mackinnon
(i869) L. R. 4 C. P. 7H. The contract is said to be void for mistake, there
being no negligence. Nevertheless, the acceptance and retention of benefits
received under this "void contract" should estop the plaintiff from enforcing
the previous contract, just as it would in the case of a contract voidable for
fraud. It would here be an accord and satisfaction but for the fact that the
defendant's performance under the "void contract" was nothing but a part
performance of the defendant's duty under the previous oral agreement.
Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 6o5. Even had the written document been
merely voidable for fraud, the plaintiff's power of avoidance should not be
destroyed by the retention of a payment less than that to which he has a
right under the operative facts of the previous oral agreement.
CRIMINAL LAw-Vow SENTENcE-ImPoSING FINE AND IMPRISONMENT WHEN
STATUTORY PENALTY IS IN THE ALTERNATr=v-The state law authorized a court
to punish for a certain crime either by fine or imprisonment. The court sen-
tenced a convicted person to imprisonment and to pay a fine of one dollar.
The prisoner paid the fine and then sought release by habeas corpus. Held,
that as the statute did not authorize both fine and imprisonment, the sentence
to imprisonmenit became void when the fine was paid. Carter, J., dissenting.
People ex rel. Maglori v. Siman (i918, Ill.) iig N. E. 94o.
The majority admit that if the relator had not paid the fine the court could
not have held either part of the sentence void as beyond the jurisdiction of the
trial court. It is difficult to see how a sentence not void when entered can be
made so ex post facto by acts of the prisoner. The view of Mr. Justice Carter,
that the sentence was not- beyond the power of the court but merely errone-
ous, seems preferable. The error should therefore have been corrected by
writ of error. Prior Illinois cases seem to sustain that view. People v. Graves
(917) 276 'Ill. 350, 1i4 N. E. 556; People v. Whitman (1917) 277 IlL 408, 115
N. E. 531. On the other hand, Ex parte Montgomery (i885) 79 Ala. 275, sup-
ports, but without discussion, the view of the majority.
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EQuiTY-BILLS To CONSTRUE WILLs-No JURISDicrioN WHEN WILL Is UNAM-
BIGUOUS AND ADVERSE CLAIMr MERELY VERBAL.-A testator devised land "to my
daughter . . . during her natural life and at her death . . . unto the
heirs of the said [daughter]." The daughter's children asserted that she had
only a life estate, and that they owned the remainder in fee. She thereupon
filed a bill in equity to construe the will and to remove the cloud from her
title. Held, that the court was without jurisdiction to construe the will or to
remove a cloud, since the will was clear and unambiguous in devising a fee
simple estate under the rule in Shelley's case, and merely verbal claims
against an owner in possession did not constitute a cloud on the title.
Greenough v. Greenough (i918, Ill.) i2o N. E. 272.
Although the court declined jurisdiction to construe this will because clear
and unambiguous, they actually rendered a declaratory judgment giving the
plaintiff in substance the very relief she sought. 'The utility of declaratory
judgments and the desirability of legislation which shall bring about this
needed procedural reform are discussed in an article by Prof. Borchard (i918)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, I, 105.
INFANTs-RIGHT TO SUE-INFANCY AS EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO GIVE STATU-
TORY NoTicE.-As a condition precedent to the recovery of damages for per-
sonal injuries from a municipal corporation, a statute required "any person"
about to sue to give notice within six months of the date of the injury. The
plaintiff, a child of seven at the time of the alleged injury, failed to give notice
within the time specified. Held, that the plaintiff was nevertheless entitled to
recover. McDonald v. City of Spring Valley (1918, Ill.) 12o N. E. 476.
The decision settles for Illinois a point upon which the authorities in other
jurisdictions are divided. New York has long taken the view which pre-
vailed here. Murphy v. Village of Fort Edward (1915) 213 N. Y. 397, 107
N. &_ 716. Mere infancy is not enough, however; it must be such as to
produce inability to give notice. Winter v. City of Niagara Falls (19O7) 190
N. Y. 198, 82 N. E. 1101. Some jurisdictions give the language of the statute
a literal interpretation which bars the infant from suit unless notice was
given. Toney v. Decatur (191) 175 Ind. 98, 93 N. E. 540; Peoples v. Val-
paraiso (1912) 178 Ind. 673, ioo N. E. 70. Many. statutes fortunately contain
provisions making exceptions for physical and mental inability to give notice.
For other authorities see 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 350; 13 Ann. Cas. 488.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-POwES-ORDINANCE REQUIRING DISCLOSURE OF
INGREDIENTS OF MEDICINES INVAID.-An ordinance of the Board of Healti. of
New York City provided that no "patent" or "proprietary" medicines should
be sold in the city unless the names of the ingredients; e:icept those physiolog-
ically inactive, were flied with the Board of Health, the records 'of the same
to be open only to persons specified in the ordinance. The plaintiffs, druggists,
sought to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance. Held, that as the ordi-
nance forbade the sale, except on the conditions specified, not only of medicines
to be acquired in the future but also of medicines already on hand, it was
beyond the powers of the Board of Health as granted by the city charter.
E. Fougera & Co., Inc. V. City of New York (i918, N. Y.) 12o N. E. 642.
Inasmuch as druggists did not know and had no reasonable means of finding
out the ingredients of "patent" and "proprietary" medicines already on
hand, the ordinance virtually prohibited the sale of such stocks. The question
whether the legislature could constitutionally make a prohibition of this kind,
the court left open. The decision seems clearly correct in holding that general
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-provisions in a city charter could not be construed to include so sweeping a
power.
REMovAL OF CAUSEs-REsIDENCE OF PAR, Es-SOME OF PLAINTIFFS NoN-REsi-
DENTS OF DisTmcr.-An action was brought in a state court of Texas by sev-
eral beneficiaries joined as plaintiffs, some of them being resident citizens of
Texas and others of Kentucky. The defendant, a Delaware corporation,
having removed the .;ause to the federal district court, the plaintiffs moved to
remand on the ground that the suit could not have been originally brought in
the federal court because some of the plaintiffs were not residents of the
district. Held, that the district court had jurisdiction on removal, although
the suit could not have been originally brought there. Jatnes v. Amarillo City
Light & Water Co. (1918, N. D. Tex.) 251 Fed. 337.
The opinion contains a careful review of the authorities dealing with this
confused subject. It repudiates the doctrine of Ex parte Wisner (i9o6) 2o3
U. S. 449, 27 Sup. Ct. I5o, and reaches the same conclusions that were advanced
in (I918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 935.
SALES-WARRANTIES-IMPLIED WARRANTY BY RESTAURATEUR OF WnoLE-
SOMENESS OF Foo.--The plaintiff ordered baked beans at the defendant's
restaurant. The dish of beans contained stones upon which the plaintiff "bit
down hard," breaking her teeth. There was no evidence of negligence on the
part of the ,defendant. Held, that the defendant was liable for breach of its
implied warranty of fitness of the food for consumption. Crosby, J., dis-
senting. Friend v. Childs Dining Hall Co. (i918, Mass.) i2o N. E. 407.
This is the first decision by a court of last resort which holds that the con-
tract between the innkeeper and the guest who orders food to be eaten on the
premises, is one of sale and hence carries an implied warranty of wholesome-
ness. See also, Barrington v. Hotel Astor (1918, App. Div.) 171 N. Y. Supp.
84o. The subject is discussed in a Comment in (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
i068. It is interesting to note that, on facts very similar to those of the prin-
cipal case, the Massachusetts court on the same day denied recovery to a
plaintiff who sued in tort instead of on the implied warranty. Ash v. Childs
Dining Hall Co. (i918, Mass.) 12o N. E. 407.
ToRTs-LABoR UNIoNs-LABrLiTy OF UNION MEMBERS FOR INJURING PLAIN-
TIFF'S BUSINESS BY FALSE STATEMENTS.-For the purpose of injuring the plain-
tiffs' business as building contractors, the members of a bricklayers union,
pursuant to a vote of the union, circulated among mason contractors false
statements that the plaintiffs were employing non-union masons. The mem-
bers of the union also refused to work for the plaintiffs. As a result, the
plaintiffs' business was destroyed. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to
recover damages -from members of the union. Martineau v. Foley (1918,
Mass.) i2o N. E. 445.
The decision is placed on the ground that the sending out of the false
statements for the purpose of destroying the plaintiffs' business constitutes
"an unlawful conspiracy." A prior case had held that equity would enjoin the
continued circulation of similar false statements even though no actual
damage was shown.. M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen (1911) 207 Mass. 394,
93 N. E. 584. Presumably an action would have lain in Massachusetts if the
false statement had been made by one person acting alone, as it has been
held in that jurisdiction that false statements made with the intent to cause
and causing damage are, unless made on a privileged occasion, actionable even
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though not technically libelous or slanderous. Morasse v. Brochu (i8go) 157
Mass. 567, 25 N. E. 74; Davis v. New Eng. Ry. Pub. Co. (i909) 2o3 Mass.
47o, 89 N. E. 565; see also Ratcliffe v. Evans [x892] 2 Q. B. 524.
WILLs-CoNTRucTIoN-LEGACY TO BE PAID "IF AND WHEN" IS CONTIN-
GENT.-The testator bequeathed 125o to each of three grandchildren to be paid
to them "if and when they shall respectively attain twenty-one." Suit was
brought to determine whether these legacies were contingent. Held, that the
legacies were contingent upon the legatees attaining twenty-one. Re Kirkley
(i918, Ch.) rug L. T. Rep. 304.
It seems to be undisputed that a legacy to A to be paid when A attains a cer-
tain age, is a vested gift despite the direction postponing payment, so that if
the legatee dies under such age his personal representative will be entitled.
Re Bartholomew (1849) I Mac. & G. 359; Smith's Estate (igio) 226 Pa. St.
304, 75 Atl. 425. No English case determining the effect of an "if and when
clause" seems to have arisen previously. The decision appears clearly sound.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-"AccDENTAL INJURIES"--ARsENICAL Poi-
SONING OF FIREMAN IN ZINC SMELTER.-An employee who had worked at a
zinc smelting furnace for thirty-eight years died of arsenical poisoning. Med-
ical witnesses testified that probably his system became surcharged with'arsenic
which finally became acute arsenical poisoning. No case of arsenical poisoning
had appeared in the employer's plant in fifty years. Held, that the employee
died from an "accidental injury," not from an occupational disease, and that
his administrator was entitled to compensation. Matthiessen v. Hegeler Zinc
CO. (1918, 111.) 12o Ni. E. 249.
Occupational diseases not resulting from a definite injury are usually held
not to be "accidents" within the meaning of compensation acts. See (0917)
27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 144. The principal case does not purport to depait
from this rule, but it is difficult on the evidence to understand the finding that
the employee's "death was due to acute arsenical poisoning not of a chronic
nature, or a culmination of a gradual development of a long course of poi-
soning."
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-CoMPENSATION Aw"AED--PRicE OF ARTrm-
ciAL LEG AS "SURGICAL AID"-The claimant received injuries which necessi-
tated the amputation of his leg. Under the Connecticut Workmen's Compen-
sation Act, which requires the employer to furnish the injured employee a
physician and "such medical and surgical aid as such physician shall deem
reasonable or necessary," an award of compensation was made and the price
of an artificial leg included therein. Held, that the award was correct. Pren-
tice, C.J., dissenting. Olmstead v. Lamphier (1918, Com.) 104 At. 488.
The allowance of compensation for splints and crutches is common. The
principal case goes a step farther in construing "surgical aid" as including
also the furnishing of artificial limbs. Under the New York Compensation
Law, the language of which is different, the cost of an artificial arm cannot
be included in the award of compensation. The principal case settles a point
upon which the rulings of the Compensation Commissioners had been con-
flicting. Pedroni v. Blakeslee & Sons (I916) I Conn. Comp. Dec. 670 (dis-
allowed); Saddlemire v. American Bridge Co. (I918) 2 ibid. 665 (allowed).
No other authorities have been found.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr-IJuMS "ARISING OUT OF' THE EMPLOY-
MENT-AsSAULT By FELLow EMpLoYs.-The claimant and another employee
were culling barrel tstaves. The other man took some staves from the claimant's
rack. He objected and a fight ensued in which he was injured. Held, that he
was entitled to compensation. Pekin Cooperage Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion (i9i8, Ill.) i2o N. E. 530.
Injuries inflicted by a fellow employee by a willfully tortious act or in
"horse-play" are generally held not to arise out of the employment. Jacque-
min v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. (1918, Conn.) io3 Atl. 115, discussed in
(1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 965. The principal case lays down the rule
that "where the disagreement arises out of the employer's work in which
two men are engaged, and as a result of it one injures the other, it may be
inferred that the injury arose out of the employment." The distinction would
help to harmonize some of the cases, which are in great confusion. It was
not adopted in the Jacquemin case.
